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No. 20150840-SC
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
__________________
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Petitioner
v.
MANUEL ANTONIO LUJAN,
Defendant/Respondent.
Respondent is incarcerated

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

INTRODUCTION
Mr. Lujan was convicted of aggravated robbery after an eyewitness
identified him at a suggestive show-up and pointed to him in court. The court of
appeals reversed the conviction due to the suggestive nature of the show-up and
the poor conditions under which the eyewitness viewed the robber during the
crime.
The State argues that, although there was suggestive State action when the
police conducted the show-up of a handcuffed Mr. Lujan, this Court should hold
that suggestive State action is step one of a two-step inquiry instead of one of the
conditions under a totality of the circumstances approach. The State next argues
that this Court should decline to set a standard necessary decide prejudice in this
case.

This Court should do the inverse: it should decline to decide whether
suggestive State action is a threshold inquiry where it is undisputed suggestive
State action was present. And it should hold that the State has the burden to
prove that the error in this case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
This Court should affirm the court of appeals’ decision, which correctly
analyzed the totality of the circumstances and held that the eyewitness
identification was inadmissible and that its admission was not harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction after granting the State’s writ of certiorari
under Utah Code section 78A-3-102(5). The court of appeals opinion is attached
as Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
This Court granted certiorari review on the following issues:
1. “Whether the majority of the panel of the Court of Appeals erred in
reversing the district court’s denial of Respondent’s motion to suppress
eyewitness identification testimony.”
2. “Whether the majority of the panel of the Court of Appeals erred in holding
the State was required to demonstrate that any error in admission of the
eyewitness identification was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and
whether it erred in concluding the admission of that testimony was not
harmless.”
2

The Court’s order granting certiorari is attached as Addendum B.
On certiorari, this Court reviews decisions of the court of appeals for
correctness. State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50, ¶ 15, 144 P.3d 1096. Whether
eyewitness identification violates the right to due process is a question of law that
is reviewed for correctness. See State v. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, ¶ 22, 48 P.3d
953.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The exclusion of an unreliable eyewitness identification is grounded in the
due process clause of the Utah Constitution.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged Mr. Lujan with aggravated robbery after a show-up
procedure. R:1-2. The eyewitness was subsequently unable to positively identify
a suspect at a lineup. State’s Ex. 42. But he later identified Mr. Lujan at the
preliminary hearing. R:355:5. Mr. Lujan filed a motion to suppress
identifications by the eyewitness, which the court denied. R:54; 356:75-76. At
trial, the jury found Mr. Lujan guilty and the court sentenced him to a suspended
prison sentence of 5 years to live, with 36 months of probation and 395 days of
jail. R:337. He was released to ICE for deportation. R:337.
The court of appeals reversed. State v. Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, ¶ 1, 357
P.3d 20. It held that the introduction of the eyewitness identification was
erroneous and prejudicial. This Court granted certiorari review.

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the date of the charged offenses, a stranger approached the eyewitness
as he prepared his car for inspection in the predawn hours. Lujan, 2015 UT App
199, ¶ 2; R:355:9. The car’s headlights were on and a working streetlamp was
twenty yards away. R:355:10, 11. The eyewitness said that a porch light mounted
twenty feet away from the car, the car’s dome light, and the illumination from the
instrument panel also provided some light. R:355:11, 15, 17, 24.
The stranger opened the rear driver’s side door and then closed it and
opened the driver’s door. Id. ¶ 3; R:355:4-5, 15-17. At first, the man was standing
about a foot away from where the eyewitness was seated in the driver’s seat.
R:355:17-18. The man crouched down with his face eight to nine inches from the
eyewitness’s for “five, seven seconds.” R:355:20. The man said to the eyewitness,
“why you following me?” Id.; R:355:5. The man then put his hand near his waist
and the eyewitness believed the man was reaching for the handle of a gun or a
knife. Id.; R:355:22. The eyewitness was afraid he might be stabbed or shot. Id.;
R:355:32.
The eyewitness was able to work his way out of the car, move around the
man, walk sideways to the front of the car, and then “bolt” to the back door. Id.;
R:355:7, 31. The eyewitness watched the man drive off in the car and alerted the
police. Id.; R:355:32-33.
The eyewitness provided a description to the police. R:355:34. He also
testified at the preliminary hearing about his memory of the man. He said the
4

man was Spanish. Id. ¶ 2; R:355:34 (Q. What about the race of the man? Can
you tell us anything about that? A. I would have to say he’s Spanish, yeah.). He
was wearing a black leather jacket that had either buttons or a zipper but was
open during the encounter. Id.; R:355:20-21. He had on a black beanie. Id.;
R:355:25. The eyewitness explained that the man’s “longish hair” poked out of
the beanie to “mid-ear length.” Id.; R:355:26. The man’s hair was straight and
its color was a combination of black and white. Id.; R:355:27. The eyewitness
“definitely” remembered the man’s hair. Id.; R:355:27-28.
The police apprehended Mr. Lujan inside an air conditioning unit at a
nearby school after following a trail of leaking car fluid and employing a K9
officer. Id. ¶ 4; R:350:46-47. Mr. Lujan told the testifying officer “something like
somebody is following me, somebody is out to get me.” Id.; R:359:8. Mr. Lujan
explained that he had been at the nearby 7-11 convenience store. R:359:8. He
then walked to the place where he was found. R:359:8. A search of the area from
the air conditioning unit, the vehicle, and the trail back to 7-11 revealed no
weapons. R:359:24. Mr. Lujan was searched at the time of his arrest and no
weapons were recovered. R:359:46. However, when he was booked into jail, an
officer listed a knife among Mr. Lujan’s possessions but did not remember what it
looked like. R:359:94, 99.
The police brought the eyewitness to Mr. Lujan’s location and informed
him that they had a suspect and wanted to see if the eyewitness could identify
him. Id. ¶ 6; R:355:36. They conducted a show-up procedure in the dark,
5

illuminating Mr. Lujan with police car headlights. Id.; R:355:37. Mr. Lujan was
the only person at the show-up who was not a police officer. Id.; R:355:36-37.
He stood with his hands cuffed while the eyewitness looked at him from the seat
of a police car. Id.; R:355:38, 55; 357:49. The police put a beanie on his head.
R:357:94. The eyewitness identified Mr. Lujan as the man who took his car. Id.;
R:355:8.
Mr. Lujan filed a motion requesting a lineup, which the court granted. Id.
¶ 7; R:18-25. At the lineup, the eyewitness was told that if he recognized any
person present in the lineup as the individual involved in the crime, he was to
mark that person’s number in a square. Id.; State’s Ex. 42. The eyewitness was
unable to positively identify anyone and left the square blank. Id.; State’s Ex. 42.
The eyewitness was also told that if he thought he recognized any person
participating in the lineup, he should mark their number on the back of the card.
State’s Ex. 42. The eyewitness marked two people from the lineup on the back of
the card: Mr. Lujan and another man. Id.; State’s Ex. 42.
At the preliminary hearing, the prosecution asked the eyewitness to point
to the man who had robbed him. Id. ¶ 8. The eyewitness pointed to Mr. Lujan.
Id.; R:355:6. After the preliminary hearing, Mr. Lujan moved to exclude evidence
of in-court identification as well as evidence that the eyewitness identified Mr.
Lujan in the show-up. The court denied the motion and permitted the eyewitness
to identify Mr. Lujan at trial as the man who robbed him. R:356:75-76; 357:20.

6

At trial, the defense called a correctional officer at the jail, who testified
that he was responsible for clothing storage at the jail. The inventory showed
that Mr. Lujan did not have a leather jacket when he was booked into jail; the
officer was not aware of items ever being misplaced. Id. ¶ 5; R:359:62-69, 75.
The defense also called an expert to testify about the reliability of eyewitness
identification. R:358.
Mr. Lujan was convicted and the court of appeals reversed. Id. ¶ 1. After
applying the state due process standard and comparing the case to State v.
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), the court held that “[t]he same factors that
led the Supreme Court to conclude that Ramirez was ‘an extremely close case’ are
present here” along with “additional indications of unreliability” — the
eyewitness remembered a robber with long hair, the eyewitness did not identify
Mr. Lujan at a lineup where conditions were less suggestive than the show-up,
and the cross-racial identification factors were more significant than they were in
Ramirez. Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, ¶¶ 13-14 (quoting Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 784).
The court of appeals was “confident that here we can ‘say that [the] testimony is
legally insufficient when considered in light of the other circumstances to warrant
a preliminary finding of reliability and, therefore, admissibility.” Id. ¶ 15
(quoting Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 784). Because the error was not harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt, the court vacated Mr. Lujan’s conviction and remanded for a
new trial. Id. ¶ 19.

7

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The court of appeals was correct in its application of precedent and its
holding. The court of appeals properly analyzed the reliability considerations
outlined in Ramirez. This Court should affirm the holding that the eyewitness
identification in this case was unreliable and inadmissible because it was
suggestive, inconsistent, and brief.
This case does not present the issue of whether suggestive government
conduct is a threshold inquiry or a factor to be considered under the totality of
the circumstances. This Court should address that issue when a case presents it.
It is undisputed that suggestive government conduct occurred in this case. But if
this Court does elect to provide guidance, it should hold that the suggestive
circumstances surrounding the lineup constitute one factor in a totality of the
circumstances analysis geared towards reliability.
The admission of the eyewitness identification was not harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. Identification was the only matter at issue and the State relied
on both the show-up and an in-court identification at trial. Mr. Lujan denied
involvement. There was no fingerprint or DNA evidence. The eyewitness
remembered a jacket and a weapon, but neither was entered into evidence. The
eyewitness’s description of a long-haired man did not match Mr. Lujan and the
eyewitness did not positively identify Mr. Lujan at a lineup where blatant
suggestive circumstances were absent. This Court should affirm.
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ARGUMENT
I.

The court of appeals did not err in its application of the reliability
analysis.
The court of appeals applied this Court’s precedent to the facts of the case

and arrived at the correct holding. “In Ramirez, the Court set forth five factors
that must be considered when analyzing the reliability of an eyewitness
identification.” State v. Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, ¶ 11, 357 P.3d 20 (citing State v.
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 (Utah 1991)). The “pertinent factors” originally
outlined in Long are:
(1) The opportunity of the witness to view the actor during the event;
(2) the witness’s degree of attention to the actor at the time of the
event; (3) the witness’s capacity to observe the event, including his or
her physical and mental acuity; (4) whether the witness’s
identification was made spontaneously and remained consistent
thereafter, or whether it was the product of suggestion; and (5) the
nature of the event being observed and the likelihood that the
witness would perceive, remember and relate it correctly. This last
area includes such factors as whether the event was an ordinary one
in the mind of the observer during the time it was observed, and
whether the race of the actor was the same as the observer’s.
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781 (brackets omitted) (quoting State v. Long, 721 P.2d
483, 493 (Utah 1986)). The list is “not an exhaustive or exclusive list of factors
that may be considered.” State v. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, ¶ 27, 48 P.3d 953.
Consideration of all these factors and the totality of the circumstances in Mr.
Lujan’s case led the court of appeals to the correct conclusion that the eyewitness
testimony was legally insufficient to “warrant a preliminary finding of reliability
and, therefore, admissibility.” See Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 784.
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A. The opportunity of the witness to view the actor during the event.
The first reliability factor analyzes the witness’s opportunity to view the
actor. “[P]ertinent circumstances include the length of time the witness viewed
the actor; the distance between the witness and the actor; whether the witness
could view the actor’s face; the lighting or lack of it; whether there were
distracting noises or activity during the observation; and any other circumstances
affecting the witness’s opportunity to observe the actor.” Id. at 782. In Mr.
Lujan’s case, the eyewitness had a brief period of seconds to view the robber, who
was a stranger to him. The eyewitness testified that at first he saw the man for
five to seven seconds when the man’s face was eight to nine inches away.
R:355:20. The man then placed his hand near his waistband, grabbing what the
witness believed to be a weapon. R:355:6. The eyewitness then extricated
himself from the car and “bolted” to his house. R:355:7. It took him eight to nine
seconds to scoot out of the driver’s seat and past the man. R:355:229. This
sequence of events left only a short window, consistently described in seconds,
during which the eyewitness had the opportunity to view the robber.
The incident occurred at night. The car’s headlights were on and a
streetlamp was twenty yards away. R:355:10, 11. The eyewitness said that a
porch light mounted twenty feet away from the car, the car’s dome light, and the
illumination from the instrument panel also provided some light. R:355:11, 15,
17, 24. Other circumstances affecting the witness’s opportunity to observe the
actor included a focus on what the eyewitness believed to be a weapon instead of
10

the robber’s features and the stress of the robbery, which left the witness
“distraught” and worried he would be stabbed or shot. R:355:32, 35.
The State argues that there was no “evidence of ‘weapon–focus effect’ that
tends to decrease the reliability of the eyewitness identification” because “no
weapon was ever produced.” State’s Brief (SB) SB 45. But the effect is the result
of “draw[ing] visual attention away from other things such as the culprit’s face.”
Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth Olson, Eyewitness Testimony, 54 Ann. Rev. Psychol.
277, 282 (2003). Participants in studies tend to make “more errors when a
weapon was inferred or present.” National Research Council of the National
Academies, Identifying the Culprit: Assessing Eyewitness Identification 96
(2014). The eyewitness in this case testified that the man’s hand was “gripping
around” what “looked like a handle” that was about “five inches” long and his
hand was “actually touching the object that was sticking out . . . of his waistband.”
R:355:22-23. It is likely more distracting to see one portion of a concealed
weapon in anticipation of seeing the rest than to see a weapon that is already in
the open. Therefore, the first Ramirez consideration counsels against admitting
the eyewitness identification from the show-up.
B. The witness’s degree of attention to the actor at the time of the event.
As noted above, the eyewitness was focusing on the robber’s hand, which
the witness believed was placed on a weapon. R:355:6. The eyewitness’s first
glimpse of the robber’s face for a period of seconds would have been startling,
and afterward the eyewitness’s focus was directed at a possible weapon and a
11

path back to the house. Although the State argues that the eyewitness was not
unduly stressed because he at first “thought the robber might want a drink or a
ride,” SB 46, studies have indicated that witnesses, even when they have
“significant opportunity to view the culprit,” are less accurate at identifying a
suspect when they “have had little reason to attend closely” because they are not
aware that a stolen item was valuable or that a crime was committed. Wells &
Olson, supra, at 282.
The State points out that, by the time the eyewitness was sitting in “the
safety and anonymity of the police cruiser,” his anxiety was likely “sooth[ed].” SB
36. But the “effects of suggestion may be particularly important when the
original memory is of a highly stressful event.” National Research Council of the
National Academies, supra, at 95 (emphasis added). In a study that looked at
military personnel participating in mock POW scenarios, the “study found that
misinformative details of the interrogation event (e.g., regarding the identity of
the interrogator), which were introduced after the event had been encoded into
long-term memory, affected identification accuracy. The study also found that
memories acquired during stressful events are highly vulnerable to modification
by exposure to post-event misinformation, even in individuals whose level of
training and experience might be considered relatively immune to such
influences.” Id. (citing C.A. Morgan III et al., Misinformation Can Influence
Memory For Recently Experienced, Highly Stressful Events, Int’l J.L. &
Psychiatry, 36(1) (2013)).
12

The State also argues that the robber remained facing the eyewitness
“without a disguise.” SB 44. But in a study where “[i]n half the robberies, the
robber wore a knit pullover cap that covered his hair and hairline” and in the
other half, “he did not wear a hat,” the “robber was less accurately identified
when he was disguised: 45% of the participants identified the robber in the lineup
test if he wore no hat during the robbery; only 27% identified him if he wore a hat
during the robbery.” Gary L. Wells, Amina Memon, & Steve D. Penrod,
Eyewitness Evidence: Improving Its Probative Value, 7 Psychol. Sci. in the Pub.
Int. 54 (2006). The eyewitness in this case stated the robber wore a black beanie.
R:355:25.
C. The witness’s capacity to observe the event, including his physical and
mental acuity.
The third factor is the witness’s capacity to observe the event. “Here,
relevant circumstances include whether the witness’s capacity to observe was
impaired by stress or fright at the time of the observation, by personal
motivations, biases, or prejudices, by uncorrected visual defects, or by fatigue,
injury, drugs, or alcohol.” Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783. “Contrary to much accepted
lore, when an observer is experiencing a marked degree of stress, perceptual
abilities are known to decrease significantly.” Long, 721 P.2d at 488-89. The
eyewitness in this case acknowledged the frightening and threatening nature of
the robbery, which left him “distraught.” R:355:35. The eyewitness testified that
during his encounter with the robber, he was afraid he might be stabbed or shot.
R:355:32. Additionally, fatigue was likely a factor because the incident occurred
13

at night when the eyewitness was awake because he had been unable to sleep.
R:355:14.
D. Whether the witness’s identification was made spontaneously and
remained consistent thereafter, or whether it was the product of
suggestion.
Relevant considerations under this reliability factor include the length of
time between the incident and the identification, “instances when the witness . . .
failed to identify defendant; instances when the witness or other eyewitnesses
gave a description of the actor that is inconsistent with defendant; and the
circumstances under which defendant was presented to the witness for
identification.” Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783. A show-up is most reliable when the
eyewitness was already familiar with the suspect. E.g., State v. Poteet, 692 P.2d
760, 763 (Utah 1984). In State v. Hoffhine, 2001 UT 4, ¶¶ 5, 18-19, 20 P.3d 265,
the Court considered it a “close question” whether the reliability factors pointed
to admissibility when two suspects were presented at a show-up and the victim
ruled out one and was confident the other was the robber. The eyewitness in this
case had never seen the man who robbed him before and did not know Mr. Lujan.
R:355:5. The time between the incident and the initial identification was about
thirty-five minutes. R:355:8.
The identification was made under circumstances similar to the show-up in
Ramirez, which troubled the court because of its “blatant suggestiveness.”
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 784. As the court of appeals put it, “[t]he same factors that
led the Supreme Court to conclude that Ramirez was ‘an extremely close case’ are
14

present here.” Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, ¶ 13. As in Ramirez, the show-up was
conducted at night and the defendant was illuminated by police car headlights.
817 P.2d at 784; R:355:37. The defendant was the only person at the show-up
who was not a police officer. Id.; R:355:36-37. “He stood with his hands cuffed”
while the eyewitness looked at him from the seat of a police car. Id.; R:355:38,
55; R:357:49. Additionally, in both cases the police notified the eyewitness before
the identification that the defendant was their suspect in the case. Id.; R:355:35;
see Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth Olson, supra, at 286 (“the ratio of accurate to
inaccurate identifications is strongly affected by whether or not eyewitnesses
have been instructed (warned) prior to viewing the lineup that the culprit might
or might not be in the lineup.”).
Furthermore, the eyewitness provided a description that did not match Mr.
Lujan and the witness was unable to identify Mr. Lujan with certainty when he
was not the only possible suspect. The eyewitness consistently described the
robber as having “longish hair” that poked out of the beanie to “mid-ear length.”
R:355:26. The eyewitness “definitely” remembered the man’s hair. R:355:27-28.
Mr. Lujan’s head was shaved when he was apprehended and when the eyewitness
identified him at the show-up. State’s Ex. 43 (booking photo); R:78 (booking
photo attached as an exhibit to the motion to exclude eyewitness identification).
Additionally, as the court of appeals noted, “the man’s original description
of the robber omitted any mention of facial hair,” which is a “feature[] that
seem[s] hard to miss at a distance of ten inches.” Lujan, 2015 UT App, ¶ 14. The
15

State writes without record citation that “Officer Bias admitted cutting short his
initial investigation with [the witness] to follow the liquid trail left by the stolen
car, suggesting [the witness] may not have gotten to that part of his identification
and did not need to revisit it once Defendant was arrested.” SB 41. The officer
testified that he spoke with the eyewitness, who provided a description.
R:357:117-18. The officer then “handed him a witness statement” and asked him
to complete it while the officer “began just checking the area visually to see if
there was anything that was dropped,” which is when he noticed the leak.
R:357:119. He did not testify that his interview was interrupted before the
witness had provided a complete description of the robber. Similarly, the witness
testified the officer found the leak “[a]fter I gave a description.” R:357:45.
The State also argues that “the inconsistencies in [the eyewitness’s]
descriptions of the robber — the hair, the jacket, and the goatee — were
reasonably explained. Through Defendant’s expert, the prosecutor established
that lighting and proximity both obscure or distort things.” SB 37. The poor
witnessing conditions do not mitigate the inconsistencies in the witness’s
description or his failure to make a positive identification absent suggestive
circumstances; rather, the poor witnessing conditions and inconsistencies are
both factors indicating the identification was not reliable and both weigh heavily
in favor of excluding it.
Even after seeing Mr. Lujan at the show-up, at a lineup procedure, which
lacks many of the highly suggestive circumstances that make a show-up
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troubling, the witness understood the instructions but did not positively identify
Mr. Lujan. R:355:39-40. Rather, he identified two men he thought looked
familiar. R:355:40-41. Long noted that identifications in a group procedure are
more reliable than show-up procedures like the ones in Ramirez and in this case.
Long, 721 P.2d at 495 n.8. The identification in this case was not spontaneous,
did not remain consistent, and was the product of suggestion.
The State argues that the “variables subject to consideration under” the
suggestiveness factor “are usefully divided into two categories: (a) the
circumstances of the identification procedure itself that may be suggestive
(procedural factors), and (b) witness behavior that may signal that the
identification was the product of suggestion rather than memory (witness
factors).” SB 33. The State provides no citation to authority in law or science
explaining why this division is useful. SB 33. It is not a useful distinction. The
State argues that blatantly suggestive circumstances can be counterbalanced by
“[w]itness confidence,” a “quick positive identification,” and testimony that the
eyewitness “identified Defendant because of his looks.” SB 35-36. 1 But “the
accuracy of an identification is, at times, inversely related to the confidence with
which it is made.” State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 490 (Utah 1986); see also
Brandon L. Garrett, Eyewitnesses and Exclusion, 65 Vand. L. Rev. 451, 453
The State argues that the eyewitness explained “that he identified Defendant
because of his looks, not because of the setting in which the identification took
place.” SB 36 (citing R:357:49-50, 94-65, 106-07). The eyewitness testified that
the identification was based on looks, but was not asked and did not address how
the suggestive setting affected him.
1
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(2012) (“eyewitness confidence[] is not a sign of reliability, but it is highly
malleable and may be the product of police suggestion”). “Social science research
has shown that a witness’s level of confidence in an identification is not a reliable
predictor of its accuracy especially where the level of confidence is inflated by its
suggestiveness.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 45 N.E.3d 83, 90 (Mass. 2016)
(alterations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Supreme Judicial
Court Study Group on Eyewitness Evidence: Report and Recommendations to
the Justices 19 (July 25, 2013)). “In short, suggestiveness is likely to inflate an
eyewitness’s certainty regarding an identification and to alter the eyewitness’s
memory regarding the quality of his or her observation of the offender to conform
to the eyewitness’s inflated level of confidence in the identification.” Id. at 91.
“[T]he problem with eyewitness testimony is that the witnesses who think they
are identifying the wrongdoer — who are credible because they believe every
word they utter on the stand — may be mistaken.” United States v. Bartlett, 567
F.3d 901, 906 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Elizabeth F. Loftus & James M. Doyle,
Eyewitness Testimony: Civil and Criminal (3d ed.1997) (collecting studies);
Elizabeth F. Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony (1979; rev. ed.1996); Daniel L.
Schacter, The Seven Sins of Memory: How the Mind Forgets and Remembers
112-37 (2001)).
This effect is on display in this case. The officer testified that the witness
did not provide hair color or mention a goatee. R:359:12; R:355:50 (his report
indicated the witness “described the suspect as being a Hispanic male wearing a
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black jacket and black hat with long hair”). The witness testified, when asked if
he mentioned a goatee to the officer, “I think I did.” R:357:87. Because blatantly
suggestive circumstances yield quick, confident, but unreliable identifications,
this Court should decline the State’s invitation to separate the dye from the water
in the analysis of suggestiveness.
E. The nature of the event being observed and the likelihood that the witness
would perceive, remember and relate it correctly.
“This last area includes such factors as whether the event was an ordinary
one in the mind of the observer during the time it was observed, and whether the
race of the actor was the same as the observer’s.” Long, 721 P.2d at 493. “[T]he
evidence concerning the reliability of [cross-racial] identification is stunning and
robust and, of crucial importance here, not likely well understood by juries.”
United States v. Smith, 621 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1215 (M.D. Ala. 2009). As
explained above, the stressful nature of the event diminishes the likelihood that
the witness was able to perceive and remember the robber.
The eyewitness described his own race as Native American and described
the robber as Spanish. R:355:34. As the court of appeals noted, in Ramirez, this
Court was “concerned with the ‘differences in racial characteristics between’ the
eyewitness and Ramirez. The Court determined, however, that because the
identification was based principally on the eyes, physical size, and clothing, these
racial factors may have been of relatively little importance.” Lujan, 2015 UT App
199, ¶ 12 (internal citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). In Mr.
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Lujan’s case, however, where the eyewitness caught a brief, close-up of the
robber’s face “‘racial factors’ are more significant here than they were in
Ramirez.” Id. ¶ 13. The State argues that a number of the eyewitness’s neighbors
“were Hispanic, including those on either side and across the street, giving him
an easy familiarity with their features.” SB 47. However, the witness’s
description of the robber as Spanish, not Hispanic, either belies such easy
familiarity or suggests that the robber was from Spain, not Latin America.
R:355:34. Additionally, studies have found that “cross-race contact . . . played
only a small role in [cross-race identification], accounting for just 2% of the
variability across participants.” Wells, Memon, & Penrod, supra, at 52. Duration
of viewing exposure, on the other hand, can interact with own-race bias.
National Research Council of the National Academies, supra, at 96. “[R]educing
the amount of time allowed for viewing of each face significantly increased the
magnitude of the bias, largely manifested as an increase in the proportion of false
alarm responses to other-race faces.” Id. (citing Christian A. Meissner & John C.
Brigham, Thirty Years of Investigating the Own-Race Bias in Memory for Faces
— A Meta-Analytic Review, 7 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 3 (2001)). The eyewitness
in Mr. Lujan’s case spent only five to seven seconds face-to-face with the robber.
R:355:20. In Ramirez the witness’s estimate of time varied from a second to “‘a
minute’ or longer.’” Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 782. The court of appeals was
therefore correct that the racial factors had more influence in this case than
Ramirez. Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, ¶ 13.
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The court of appeals wrote that if “Ramirez was an extremely close call, we
are confident that here we can say that the man’s testimony is legally insufficient
when considered in light of the other circumstances to warrant a preliminary
finding of reliability and, therefore, admissibility.” Id. ¶ 15 (internal quotation
marks omitted). The totality of the circumstances suggested that the eyewitness
identification from the show-up was unreliable and should not have been
admitted. The eyewitness provided a description of a man he saw during a highstress robbery for a matter of several seconds. The pre-show-up description
differed from Mr. Lujan significantly because Mr. Lujan had a goatee and did not
have any hair, let alone the mid-ear length hair the suspect remembered.
R:355:26; 359:12. The eyewitness did not provide the “salt and pepper”
description until after the show-up. R:359:12. When asked to identify the
robber, even after the show-up, in a lineup with eight men, the eyewitness did not
positively identify Mr. Lujan. State’s Ex. 42. The in-court identification was
tainted both by the earlier show-up and by the suggestive circumstances of a
courtroom identification. See State v. Mincy, 838 P.2d 648, 657 (Utah Ct. App.
1992) (“unnecessarily suggestive” identification procedures give rise to “the
possibility of irreparable misidentification”). Mr. Lujan was the only defendant
sitting at counsel table and the only realistic choice. Under these circumstances,
the court of appeals was correct that due process required the exclusion of the
suggestive and unreliable eyewitness identification.
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II. This Court should not rearrange the analysis set forth in
precedent.
The State concedes that “the showup identification of Defendant in this
case was suggestive.” SB 32-33. The show-up procedure the police employed
was virtually identical to the one this Court criticized for its “blatant
suggestiveness” in 1991. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 784 (Utah 1991). As in
Ramirez, Mr. Lujan “‘was the only person at the showup who was not a police
officer,’ he ‘stood with his hands cuffed,’ and the ‘headlights of several police cars
were trained on him.’” State v. Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, ¶ 12, 357 P.3d 20
(quoting Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 784)). This case therefore is not like Perry v. New
Hampshire, where the identification occurred “spontaneously,” “without any
inducement from the police,” when the eyewitness “pointed to her kitchen
window and said the person . . . was standing in the parking lot,” and the Court
was thus squarely presented with the issue of whether suggestive police activity is
a threshold inquiry. 132 S. Ct. 716, 722 (2012) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Both sides agree that this Court must consider all the reliability factors
Ramirez outlined. This case does not present the issue of whether the
suggestiveness of the identification is a threshold inquiry or a factor to be
considered in an overall reliability analysis. And this Court has “unequivocally
declared that ‘courts are not a forum for hearing academic contentions or
rendering advisory opinions.’” Utah Transit Authority v. Local 382 of

22

Amalgamated Transit Union, 2012 UT 75, ¶ 19, 289 P.3d 582 (quoting Baird v.
State, 574 P.2d 713, 715 (Utah 1978)). There is no reason to rearrange the
reliability analysis at the State’s request in a case where rearrangement would
serve no practical function. Whether the due process concerns relating to
eyewitness identification should focus on suggestiveness or general reliability is a
serious, contested issue. See Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 731 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the holding “recasts the driving force of our decisions as an interest
in police deterrence, rather than reliability.”); Commonwealth v. Johnson,
45N.E. 3d 594, 598 (Mass. 2016) (“where a witness’s identification of a defendant
arises from highly or especially suggestive circumstances, its admissibility should
not turn on whether government agents had a hand in causing the confrontation
because the evidence would be equally unreliable in each instance.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); see also Gary L. Wells, Amina Memon, & Steve D.
Penrod, Eyewitness Evidence Improving Its Probative Value, 7 Psychol. Sci. in
the Pub. Int. 45, 46 (2006) (“But even if the system reaches a point at which it
makes perfect use of system variables, eyewitness errors attributable to other
factors will remain.”). This Court should not make a decision that reconsiders
precedent until the facts of the case, not one of the parties, demands it.
Furthermore, the State’s argument that suggestive police conduct was
always a threshold inquiry in Utah is new to its brief on certiorari. It was not
argued in the State’s trial court response to the motion to suppress. R:121-26
(setting forth the “five reliability factors” and addressing them in that order). The
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State presented its argument to the court of appeals as a totality of the
circumstances analysis. It argued that “[u]nder the Utah Constitution, the
ultimate question is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the
identification was sufficiently reliable even though the identification employed by
police may have been suggestive.” Ct. of Appeals Br. Appellee 21. The State listed
the Long considerations, which place “whether the witness’s identification was
made spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter, or whether it was the
product of suggestion” as the fourth of five factors. Ct. of Appeals Br. Appellee 15.
And the State addressed the factors in that order. Ct. of Appeals Br. Appellee 29
(addressing suggestiveness as point four). The State now argues that “the court
of appeals applied a state due process model not contemplated by Ramirez,” SB
27, but the State presented that model in its brief to the court of appeals.
The State argues that addressing the issue now would “prevent further
confusion about and misapplication of the state due process analysis.” SB 29.
But providing guidance in this case, where the holding would not depend on that
guidance, would create more confusion. State v. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, ¶¶ 2526, 48 P.3d 953, held that the “standard for determining whether defendant’s
right to due process as guaranteed by article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution
was denied is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the identifications
were reliable.” Hubbard held that the photo array in that case was “not
impermissibly suggestive” but its analysis did not end there because “[e]ven if law
enforcement procedures are appropriate and do not violate due process,
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eyewitness identification testimony must still pass the gatekeeping function of
the trial court and be subject to a preliminary determination whether the
identification is sufficiently reliable to be presented to the jury.” Id. ¶ 26 (citing
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 778-79). Addressing the issue in this case, therefore, would
create an interesting but unnecessary dilemma for lawyers, judges, law
enforcement, and the general public. They would be left to wonder whether
language in this case addressing an issue that is not necessary to the holding
overrules Hubbard. This Court should avoid that confusion by waiting for a true
opportunity to address the dispute head-on.
However, if this Court does choose to address the question of whether
suggestive government conduct is a threshold inquiry, it should clarify that it is
not. Rather, as recognized in the State’s earlier analysis in this case, the ultimate
inquiry is reliability, and suggestive circumstances are an important but not the
threshold consideration in the analysis. Ramirez made a conscious departure
from the federal model: “We therefore hold that for purposes of determining the
due process reliability of eyewitness identifications under article I, section 7, we
will not limit ourselves to an analytical model that merely copies the federal. We
will require an in-depth appraisal of the identification’s reliability along the lines
laid out by Long.” Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 780. The approach is “more
appropriate” and will “meet or exceed in rigor the federal standard.” Id. at 78081.
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When Ramirez said that its “approach departs from federal case law only
to the degree we find the federal analytical model scientifically unsupported,” it
did so in the context of explaining that an identification deemed admissible
under the Utah standard would necessarily also be admissible under the federal
analysis. Id. at 780. “Since this approach departs from federal case law only to
the degree that we find the federal analytical model scientifically unsupported, we
have no doubt that the more empirically based approach of Long will allow a
court to consider fully ‘the totality of the circumstances’ surrounding the
identification, as required by Biggers and its progeny, or that the resulting
reliability determination will meet or exceed in rigor the federal standard as
expressed in Biggers and Stovall.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus,
“because [the Court] found article I, section 7 [of the Utah Constitution] satisfied,
[there was] no need to perform a separate Biggers federal analysis.” Id. at 784.
That Ramirez lists suggestiveness as the fourth of five factors, and
addresses it “[f]inally,” plainly indicates that suggestiveness is not a threshold
inquiry. Id. at 784. Additionally, Ramirez compared the reliability inquiry in
eyewitness cases to scientific evidence, where no government misconduct is
required. 817 P.2d at 778-79 (“discussing need for threshold reliability
examination by trial court prior to admission of scientific evidence, even though
jury will ultimately determine weight”). It focused on the important gatekeeping
function of the trial court and noted that the “danger of . . . an abdication of
responsibility is particularly serious where the admission of an eyewitness
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identification is concerned because of the probability that such evidence even
though thoroughly discredited has a powerful effect on a jury.” Id. at 779.
Later, Hubbard set out the two separate due process approaches based on
the defendant’s two separate challenges. 2002 UT 45. Hubbard begins with the
federal “two-part test.” Id. ¶ 23. Under the federal analysis, the Court held that
the “pretrial identification procedures . . . were not impermissibly suggestive” and
thus “federal due process was not violated.” Id. ¶ 24. “As a result,” the Court did
not need to “address whether the subsequent in-court identifications were
sufficiently based on untainted, independent foundations to be reliable.” Id.
The Court could not use the same analytical model to handle the Utah due
process challenge, however. “Utah courts examine the procedural actions taken
by law enforcement officials in assembling and presenting a photo array to
witnesses for due process, and Utah courts also make a preliminary
determination on whether the identification is sufficiently reliable such that its
admission and consideration by the jury will not violate defendant’s right to due
process.” Id. ¶ 25. This is because in Utah, “[e]ven if law enforcement
procedures are appropriate and do not violate due process, eyewitness
identification must still pass the gatekeeping function of the trial court and be
subject to a preliminary determination whether the identification is sufficiently
reliable to be presented to the jury.” Id. ¶ 26. The Court therefore proceeded to
analyze the Long factors and concluded that under the facts of that case, “the
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witness identifications were not so unreliable as to warrant exclusion of the
identification testimony from consideration by the jury.” Id. ¶¶ 27-30.
In Ramirez and Hubbard, this Court set out an analytical model more like
the one explained by the dissent than the majority in Perry v. New Hampshire,
132 S. Ct. at 730 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). It was the dissent’s position that the
“driving force” of the due process line of eyewitness cases was “reliability,” not
“police deterrence.” Id. at 731. The dissent explained that although “[p]olice
machinations can heighten the likelihood of misidentification, . . . they are no
prerequisite to finding a confrontation ‘so impermissibly suggestive as to give risk
to a very substantial likelihood of misidentification.’” Id. at 733 n.3. The dissent
noted that a “vast body of scientific literature has reinforced every concern . . .
articulated” in the case law regarding the reliability and thus admissibility of
eyewitness identification. Id. at 738; see also Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, ¶ 10 n.1.
The “focus[] on overall reliability,” Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 735, stressed by the dissent
echoes Ramirez’s holding that the “ultimate question to be determined is
whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the identification was reliable.”
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781.
Utah courts consistently use the Ramirez analytical model, focusing on the
overall reliability of the eyewitness identification. State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, ¶
45, 993 P.2d 837 (Addressing all factors although the identification “was not the
product of suggestion”); State v. Glasscock, 2014 UT App 221, ¶ 26, 336 P.3d 46
(“To evaluate admissibility of an eyewitness identification, we examine the
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‘totality of the circumstances’ to determine whether ‘the eyewitness testimony is
sufficiently reliable so as not to offend a defendant’s right to due process.”
(alterations omitted)); State v. Clark, 2014 UT App 56, ¶ 50, 322 P.3d 761
(applying the Ramirez factors to determine that “[u]nder the totality of the
circumstances” the identifications “were sufficiently reliable for admission at
trial”); State v. Rivera, 954 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (concluding that
an identification met “all of the Ramirez reliability factors”). The State’s request
that this Court “clarify” Ramirez is actually a request that this Court overrule it
without meeting the “substantial burden” of proving that the precedent is neither
persuasive and nor firmly established. See State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 39899 (Utah 1994); Eldridge v. Johndrow, 2015 UT 21, ¶ 21, 345 P.3d 553 (“Because
stare decisis is so important to the predictability and fairness of a common law
system, we do not overrule our precedents lightly.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
Although Ramirez labeled its test as “more stringent than[] the federal
analysis,” the case law does not suggest that the framework has led to the
exclusion of many eyewitness identifications. In fact, in the twenty-five years
since Ramirez, counsel is aware of no other Utah appellate case declaring an
eyewitness identification inadmissible. Cf. Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 737 (Sotomayor,
J., dissenting) (“The vast majority of eyewitnesses proceed to testify before a jury.
To date, Foster is the only case in which [the United State Supreme Court has]
found a due process violation.”). Despite this Court’s criticism of the suggestive
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show-up procedure the police employed in Ramirez, the identification was
admissible in that case and the police employed the same suggestive show-up
procedure in this case. When the majority and the dissent agreed in Lujan that
“the time may have arrived for the Utah Supreme Court to revisit its holding in
State v. Ramirez,” it was the admissibility of unreliable identifications like the
one deemed admissible in Ramirez and the continuing use of unnecessarily
suggestive show-up procedures that concerned them. Lujan, 2015 UT App 199,
¶¶ 21 (Pearce, J., dissenting), 10 n.1 (majority opinion).
This Court should thus reaffirm that the Utah due process analysis differs
from the federal analysis because it focuses on overall reliability, using suggestive
government conduct as a factor in the analysis but not a threshold inquiry, the
absence of which could prevent the court from fulfilling “its charge as gatekeeper”
when it comes to powerful but unreliable eyewitness identifications. See
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 778. Utah’s due process analysis allows courts to consider
subtly but not intentionally suggestive identification procedures, or suggestive
procedures arranged by non-government parties, in combination with the other
reliability considerations for a holistic approach that both encourages best
practices in identification procedures and guards against wrongful convictions.
See Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 726 (“A primary aim of excluding identification evidence
obtained under unnecessarily suggestive circumstances . . . is to deter law
enforcement use of improper lineups, showups, and photo arrays in the first
place.”); see id. at 738 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The empirical evidence
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demonstrates that eyewitness misidentification is the single greatest cause of
wrongful convictions in this country.” (internal quotation marks omitted));
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 779 (“The danger of such an abdication of [the trial court’s
gatekeeping] responsibility is particularly serious where the admissibility of an
eyewitness identification is concerned because of the probability that such
evidence even though thoroughly discredited has a powerful effect on the jury.”).
III. The admission of the eyewitness identification was not harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.
The State argues that this Court should apply the harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt standard in this case without establishing any precedent. SB 18
(“The standard should remain undecided in this jurisdiction”). This is a change
of course, as the State’s petition for certiorari argued that the “issue of whether
the burden shifts to the State to prove that a preserved state constitutional error
in admission of eyewitness identification testimony is harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt is a matter of first impression which should be decided by this
Court.” Pet. Cert. 18. And this Court granted the petition to review that question.
Add. B.
The court of appeals noted that if “Utah’s approach ‘is certainly as stringent
as, if not more stringent than, the federal analysis,’” as explained in Ramirez,
then “there is no reason to assume our constitution would impose a different
[and less stringent] standard of review for those few circumstances where our
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constitution is violated but the federal constitution is not.” Lujan, 2015 UT App
199, ¶ 16 n.2.
Constitutional errors, including unreliable eyewitness identifications, must
be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. This Court has explained that the
standard harmless error analysis “does not govern errors . . . that are
constitutional in nature.” State v. Villarreal, 889 P.2d 419, 425 (Utah 1995).
“Where the error in question amounts to a violation of a defendant’s”
constitutional rights, “its harmlessness is to be judged by a higher standard, i.e.,
reversal is required unless the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). The admission of unreliable eyewitness
evidence is a violation of constitutional due process. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 780.
Utah courts must “scrutinize” eyewitness identification testimony for
“constitutional defects.” State v. Nelson, 950 P.2d 940, 944 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)
(internal quotation marks omitted). When such defects exist, the State must
prove they are harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Villarreal, 889 P.2d at 425.
Federal circuit courts have applied the harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt test to eyewitness identification admitted in violation of due process. E.g.,
United States v. Stubblefield, 621 F.2d 980, 983 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Russell, 532 F.2d 1063, 1068-69 (6th Cir. 1976). “[B]efore a federal
constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a
belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Chapman v. California,
386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). A violation of due process under the Utah Constitution
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should be no less serious to this Court than a violation under the United States
Constitution. The U.S. Supreme Court declared that it was its “responsibility to
protect” federal constitutional rights “by fashioning the necessary rule.” Id. at 21.
It is this Court’s responsibility to protect Utah Constitutional rights, and where
fairness and reliability under due process are concerned, the harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt standard is appropriate. The United States Supreme Court
adopted the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt test for certain constitutional
errors because although “there are some constitutional rights so basic to a fair
trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error,” there are some
“which in the setting of a particular case are so unimportant and insignificant
that they may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not
requiring automatic reversal of the conviction.” Id. at 22-23.
In State v. Bullock, 699 P.2d 753, 756 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme
Court concluded that an eyewitness identification was admissible under the due
process clause and that, furthermore, “the trial court’s denial of the motion to
suppress did not affect defendant’s substantial rights” because there was strong
evidence of guilt even absent the identification. Chapman noted the similarity
between the substantial rights test and the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
test: both tests “emphasize[] an intention not to treat as harmless those
constitutional errors that ‘affect substantial rights’ of a party.” Chapman, 386
U.S. at 24.
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Nevertheless, the State argues that Ramirez, Nelson, and Clopten applied
the reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result standard. 2 Ramirez applied
that standard to a different error. The defendant in Ramirez “raise[d] several
issues on appeal,” first that “the introduction of the eyewitness identification
violated his right to due process of law under article I, section 7 of the Utah
Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
because the identification was unreliable,” and second that he was
unconstitutionally stopped without articulable reasonable suspicion. 817 P.2d at
778. The Court never addressed what standard of harmlessness applies to the
eyewitness identification issue because the Court concluded that the eyewitness
identification was properly admitted. Id. at 784.
The Court then addressed the claim that the defendant was illegally
stopped. Id. at 785. This claim presented the Court with a “difficult problem”
because the “trial judge simply refrained from passing on the issue [when
defendant raised it] and let the evidence resulting from the stop and seizure go to
the jury.” Id. at 787. The Court held that it was error for the judge to “permit[]
the evidence of the stop and seizure and the fruits of that stop, including the
eyewitness identification, in evidence without determining its constitutional
admissibility.” Id. at 788. And it was this failure, not the admission of an
The parties, however, ultimately agree that this Court should employ the
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard to this case. SB 50-51 (arguing
there is “no reason to reach” the issue of the standard for prejudice and
“assuming application of the federal standard”). The federal standard is
appropriate, but the error was harmful under either standard.

2
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unconstitutionally unreliable eyewitness identification, that the Court deemed
harmful under the non-constitutional test. Id. Ramirez never held or suggested
that unconstitutionally admitted eyewitness identification is subject to the same
harmlessness test.
Rather, Ramirez suggested that a harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
standard would have applied if the eyewitness testimony was unconstitutionally
unreliable. Ramirez held that “[t]he burden of demonstrating the admissibility
of the proffered evidence is on the prosecution” and the “defendant is then
entitled to a determination by the court of the evidence’s constitutional
admissibility.” Id. at 778. This language suggests that, when there is an error in
the process, the prosecution should bear the burden of proving it was
constitutionally harmless.
The State cites State v. Nelson, 950 P.2d at 944-45, a court of appeals case
that also involved the failure to address an issue instead of the admission of
evidence that violated due process. At the suppression hearing for the eyewitness
identification, the trial court in Nelson “did not make findings as required by
Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, did not consider any of the
circumstances surrounding the identification in light of the Ramirez factors, and
did not make a preliminary determination of reliability.” Id. at 943-44 (footnote
omitted). Similar to the trial court in Ramirez’s handling of the stop and seizure
motion, the trial court in Nelson “sidestepped its gatekeeping responsibility by
failing to determine the constitutional admissibility of the eyewitness
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identification testimony.” Id. at 944. The court of appeals held that the “trial
court’s failure to make any findings and failure to make any legal determination
as to the constitutional admissibility of the eyewitness identification was error.”
Id. The court determined that there was a reasonable likelihood of a more
favorable result absent the error and remanded for a new trial instead of asking
the trial court “to address the admissibility question” and “tempt it to reach a
post hoc rationalization for admission of this pivotal evidence.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). It never held that admitted eyewitness identification
evidence was constitutionally unreliable and therefore did not address what the
test for prejudice would be in such a case.
Finally, the State cites State v. Clopten, 2009 UT 84, ¶ 39, 223 P.3d 1103.
SB 50. But the issue in Clopten was not whether it was harmful error to admit
constitutionally unreliable eyewitness identification; the issue was “whether
expert testimony regarding the reliability of eyewitness identification should be
presumed admissible when timely requested.” Id. ¶ 6. The Court in Clopten
addressed an evidentiary issue, not a constitutional violation. Id. ¶¶ 30-38
(analyzing the admissibility of expert testimony regarding eyewitness
identification under Utah Rule of Evidence 702). Clopten held the error was
harmful and reversed under the standard harmless error analysis and never
addressed what standard would apply to unreliable eyewitness identification
admitted in violation of constitutional due process. Id. ¶¶ 48-49.
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The court of appeals correctly concluded that the admission of the
eyewitness identification in this case was not harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, ¶ 19. Without the identification, “the State loses
its strongest evidence against Defendant.” Id. As the prosecution noted in
closing, “there’s not a whole lot of dispute about what happened. The dispute lies
with who did it.” R:362:8. Absent the eyewitness’s confident in-court and showup identifications, the State did not provide strong evidence of guilt. In fact, the
officer who orchestrated the show-up testified that if the eyewitness had not
identified Mr. Lujan as the robber, “we would know that he was not our suspect
and we would know that we need to continue our search.” R:359:31. The
eyewitness described a robber with long hair and an open leather jacket.
R:357:85 (testifying that he could “definitely see hair sticking out of the sides of
the hat”), 83-84 (describing a leather jacket that “definitely” opened in the front).
Mr. Lujan had a goatee, closely shaved hair, and the evidence indicated he had no
jacket. R:357:59, 62-69, 75, 137. The State makes much of the officers’ testimony
that they also remembered a jacket. SB 12, 37, 42-43, 51. But the officer who
testified about clothing storage at the jail was not aware of items ever being
misplaced. R:359:62-69, 75. The jury might then question whether the officers’
memories were influenced by the witness’s description. And the loss or
destruction of evidence would only further damage the State’s case.
Even after the show-up, the eyewitness was not able to positively identify
Mr. Lujan at a lineup; he could indicate only that he thought he recognized Mr.
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Lujan and another man. State’s Ex. 42. Furthermore, Mr. Lujan’s statements to
the police denied involvement in the robbery. R:359:8, 32. The police did not
recover fingerprints from the inside of the vehicle, and did not attempt to dust
the outside or collect DNA evidence. R:359:7.
And, although Mr. Lujan was found relatively near the abandoned vehicle
and a K9 officer was employed, the officer who found Mr. Lujan described his
inclination to go towards the air conditioning unit as a “gut feeling” based on a
rustling noise after he had “split up” with the K9 officer. R:359:17-18. The officer
testified that the dog began to pull the handler hard when the officers reached the
walkway gate of the school, which was an indication that the dog had “picked up
on a track of the person that they are looking for.” R:357:128. The State
describes the dog’s “discernment of a lone scent,” SB 51-52, but the State cites no
record source for this assertion and the K9 handler did not testify. The dog
pulled the officers through the walkway gate. R:357:128. Afterwards, the dog
“pull[ed] . . . toward some portable or relocatable classrooms.” R:357:128-29.
But at that point the officer and the K-9 handler “kind of split our efforts so that
[they] wouldn’t be ambushed from behind.” R:357:129.
When the officer had the gut feeling, he did not “alert the canine handler
because [he] didn’t want to give [his] position away.” R:357:130. The dog did not
return until the officer “had a weapon out and pointed” and was giving
commands to Mr. Lujan. R:359:28. The officer’s “commands seemed to prompt
the K-9 officer to come over to [his] location.” R:359:28. The court of appeals
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